By 3 September 2017DATA EXFILTRATION

HackedIn (±x)

Published on 3rd September 2017

Joseph S R de Saram (JSRDS)

Information Security Architect / Intelligence Analyst / Computer Scientist / Human Rights Activist / COMSEC / SIGINT / TSCM

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Almost a year ago, I wrote the following article:-

Grand Theft Data v5

20161122 LATEST SERVER HACK FROM LITTLE BRITAIN Tania has been reporting a number of unauthorised accesses of her home computer (in Rotherham) over the past few weeks, and I review server logs from time to time in addition...

and having just re-read it I see that various audio recordings have been removed. Notwithstanding that, one of the issues relates to the hacking of my social media accounts.

Incoming Social Media Messages

As I have mentioned frequently, I do not read incoming messages on social media – there is no readily available audit trail in relation to the source of the messages, and of course those messages can be easily modified or deleted.

Additionally LinkedIn takes no steps to verify the profiles of its members either in terms of standard ID or verification of credentials.

Last Week

These screenshots are from 24 August 2017:-


showing over a hundred unread messages. The figure in the subsequent days was much higher due to ‘endorsing weekend’.

By way of information, ‘Linked Helper’ is a browser plugin which I have installed but not used.

Additional Sessions

On 28 August 2017 I was using LinkedIn via my Android Tablet and noticed an additional session which suddenly appeared, 9mins before 20:43 time:-

Close up:-

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Evidence of Message Interception and/or Modification

The following screenshots from the following morning 29 August 2017 confirm that the number of unread messages have decreased:-


This is clearly the work of parties who have access to the internal interface of LinkedIn and/or able to use a specific IP address which the LinkedIn app can ignore, which results in no footprint – I reckon Law Enforcement or an Intelligence agency.


Restating of Contact Methods

On the front page of my LinkedIn profile


the reliable methods for communicating with me are listed, and an excerpt of the text is:-

“Having enhanced our e-mail systems, general business-related contact can be made via joe@rhodium.com and friends can use jos.eph@de.sar.am . You may use financial@jsrds.com for matters of a financial nature and legal@jsrds.com for legal issues. Contractors are responsible for handling e-mail and there are specific terms that need to be accepted first otherwise your e-mails will be rejected automatically at server level.”

“You may apply for access to the general e-mail system using https://secureform.luxsci.com/forms/17179/8622/lFz0/form.html . Legal issues can be resolved using https://secureform.luxsci.com/forms/17179/8624/W1zQ/form.html .”

“Incoming messages to social media accounts such as LinkedIn, Facebook and Twitter are not monitored for similar reasons because human resources are already stretched. Autoresponders have been removed to minimise backscatter bounce.”

“You may also use voice communications to speak to me directly due to the various hacking issues, caused by tortious interference and injurious falsehoods by fraudulent parties in Australia, Singapore, Sri Lanka and elsewhere.”

The Bottom Line

Frankly I am past caring about how the security services have become so politicized. But me being labelled as having Paranoid Schizophrenia and having my fundamental human rights withdrawn despite forensic evidence, is the utterly disgraceful part…

The case continues…


Joseph S R de Saram (JSRDS)

Information Security Architect / Intelligence Analyst / Computer Scientist / Human Rights Activist / COMSEC / SIGINT / TSCM